Imagine this scenario: A detective conducts an interrogation at the station-house without providing Miranda warnings, securing a voluntary confession. Two hours later, the same detective, in the same station-house interview room, properly Mirandizes the suspect and elicits the same confession.
The burning question: Are either of these confessions admissible in court? While we staunchly argue against it, courts typically permit the second confession into evidence while excluding the first.
Issues surrounding sequential confessions often arise in the context of Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), a common occurrence in criminal courts. This refers to a deliberate two-step approach where police question first and warn later to circumvent the effectiveness of midstream Miranda warnings. Seibert, however, struck down this practice, leading to the exclusion of both confessions.
In our experience, many trial courts and published decisions, when faced with otherwise voluntary unwarned statements followed by properly warned ones, tend to focus on Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). They dismiss Seibert and seemingly revert to a pre-Miranda era. It appears as if these courts forget the fundamental Miranda holding: Statements derived from custodial interrogation without warnings and a valid waiver are irrefutably presumed compelled and thus inadmissible in the government’s case in chief. Even if unwarned statements are otherwise voluntary under the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause, they are still disregarded without proper warnings and a valid waiver.
THE LEVENTHAL FIRM is eager to highlight a recent Circuit decision – Reyes v. Lewis, ___F.3d ___, 2016 WL ____(9th Cir., August 17, 2016). This rare published decision not only discusses but genuinely implements Seibert in a sequential confession case where the first unwarned confession is deemed voluntary (via the 14th Amendment, not the 5th). Most notably, the Reyes interrogations occurred on separate, consecutive days, challenging the conventional emphasis on the time gap between interrogations. While Seibert’s confessions were separated by 40 minutes, Reyes successfully argues that even separate days do not negate our defense-oriented Seibert claims—a crucial aspect benefiting our clients.