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DUI Sentencing: Part II – Prior Convictions and Sentencing Enhancements

DUI Sentencing:  Part II – Prior Convictions and Sentencing Enhancements


The punishment for driving under the influence in California (VC 23152) increases if the prosecution proves prior DUI convictions within a 10 year window.  Also, several facts, or special allegations may enhance a DUI sentence if properly pled and proven.

Prior DUI Convictions

In California, prior convictions for VC 23152, VC 23153, or VC 23103/23103.5 (“wet reckless”), can be used to enhance the sentence for a DUI.[i]  The prosecution can use convictions from a 10-year period surrounding the current DUI offense; this 10-year period looks forward and back, meaning that the “prior conviction” can actually be for a DUI incident date after the incident date of the case currently being prosecuted.[ii]

  • Second time DUI Sentencing[iii]: The court has a series of probation conditions at its disposal for a second DUI. The maximum jail time is 364 days; the court shall impose either at least 96 hours or at least 10 days jail in addition to the fine of $390-$1000.  The court will generally impose more severe DUI probation conditions if the prosecution proves that your blood alcohol level exceeded .15 or that you refused a chemical test (any BAC test post-arrest).  Any jail time imposed must include 48 consecutive hours in custody or a minimum 10 days of community service.[iv]  If probation is granted, the term can be anywhere from 3 to 5 years.
  • Third time DUI Sentencing[v]: Mandatory minimum of 120 days in jail; 364 days maximum. However, the mandatory minimum jail time can be reduced to 30 days in jail if the court agrees to a 30-month alcohol treatment program.  Probation will typically be for 5 years with a third DUI.
  • Fourth Time DUI Sentencing[vi]: A fourth DUI conviction over a 10-year period is punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony. If granted probation, a mandatory 180 day jail term must be served.  You will also be designated as a habitual traffic offender which flags the DMV about your driving record, among other things. As a practical matter, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office will file all 4th DUIs as felonies.  Residential treatment can satisfy mandatory jail in a multiple offense DUI scenario, but the client must follow THE LEVENTHAL FIRM’S advice to a tee (see e.g., PC 2900.5(a)).

Special Allegations

These California DUI sentencing enhancements are not separate crimes.  They describe specific facts or particular conduct, and must be proven by the prosecutor:

  • Reckless Driving and Excessive Speed: If you were driving recklessly (within the meaning of VC 23103) AND speeding (30 mph over a highway speed limit or 20 mph over any other posted speed limit), a mandatory 60 days jail will be imposed, consecutive to any other sentence.[vii]
  • Refusal to Take a Chemical Test: Refusing to take a blood or breath test upon a police officer’s proper advisement post-lawful arrest will result in additional mandatory jail time[viii]: 96 hours jail time is added to the sentence for a second DUI in California; 10 days jail for a third DUI; and 18 days for a fourth DUI in the refusal context.
  • Child Passenger: If you are convicted of a simple DUI (VC 23152), and the prosecution proves there was a passenger under 14 years old in the car, mandatory jail time is imposed, even when probation is granted.[ix] For a first time DUI in California, an additional 48 hours in jail is required.  The sentence for a second-time DUI is enhanced by 10 days in jail; a third-time DUI by 30 days.[x] Ordinarily, prosecutors will elect to file a PC 273a(b) (child endangerment) in lieu of the minor enhancement because it increases exposure.

In addition to the various DUI probation conditions imposed by the court, the DMV will suspend (or re-suspend) your license to drive once notified of a DUI conviction from the court; and, the length of the license suspension increases with every prior the DMV has on record.  For more information about the interrelationship between a criminal court case and DMV suspension actions, call our Los Angeles and Pasadena DUI expert lawyers at THE LEVENTHAL FIRM.  Our lawyers will investigate your prior DUI convictions and move to strike any that are invalid or unconstitutional.   If you have questions about DUI probation conditions, typical DUI sentences in Los Angeles or Pasadena, or you are facing complex multiple offense DUI criminal charges, contact our DUI attorneys today for a thorough case evaluation.

[i] Certain out-of-state DUI convictions may also be used as sentence-enhancing DUI priors.  See Cal VC 23626.

[ii] People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal 4th 1210

[iii] Cal VC 23540, Cal VC 23542

[iv] Cal VC 23580

[v] Cal VC 23546, Cal VC 23548

[vi] Cal VC 23550

[vii] Cal VC 23582

[viii] Cal VC 23577

[ix] Cal VC 23572

[x] Driving under the influence while a child is in the car is conduct chargeable under Penal Code 273a.  In California, the additional 30 days for the Vehicle Code enhancement cannot be imposed if you are also convicted of PC 273a.

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Know Your Rights: Part 1.1 – The Fourth Amendment – Search & Seizure


We will start with the Fourth Amendment – search and seizure law. Part 1.1 discusses what the Fourth Amendment says, what it protects and when it applies.

The Fourth Amendment – What it Says and What it Protects 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects us from unreasonable governmental intrusions into our private domain.  In this context, the “domain” includes private spaces and private objects.  This is the actual text:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV.

What does this mean? It means that: (1) the police must justify any search (or seizure) that was done without a warrant; and/or (2) the police may seek judicial authorization (a warrant) to search (or seize).  If the police decide to get court permission (a warrant), then they must show the court that they have probable cause – enough evidence that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the things desired to be searched (or seized) are connected to criminal activity.  And, again, if the police search or seize absent a warrant, then they must justify that warrantless intrusion. We will discuss what justifies warrantless intrusions later in this Part.

When Does the Fourth Amendment Apply? 

The Fourth Amendment’s protections are not triggered unless and until we have some government actor that initiates a “search” or a “seizure.” The legal terms “search” and “seizure” have precise Fourth Amendment definitions. Thus, police behavior that many believe constitutes a search or a seizure will not activate our Fourth Amendment privacy protections if that conduct falls outside of these precise legal definitions.  What constitutes a “search” and what constitutes a “seizure?”


The United States Supreme Court articulated the Fourth Amendment definition of a “search” in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  In Katz, federal agents placed a listening device against the wall of a public phone booth that Katz was using and listened in on Katz’s private phone conversation. Katz was discussing an illegal wagering operation and sought to exclude evidence of his phone booth conversation as a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court found a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment even though the listening device was placed on the phone booth exterior. The Court stressed that the focus is not whether the government physically trespassed, but whether the person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the sphere that the police sought to invade. Here, Katz did what he could to make the conversation private – he used an enclosed phone booth. Thus, any attempt to invade that sphere amounted to a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Because the Fourth Amendment was activated, the federal agents in Katz would have had to get a warrant to listen in or justify that it was a reasonable warrantless wiretap.

But, a person with misplaced confidence in a government actor does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in what would otherwise be a private sphere.  What does that mean?

It means that the suspect cannot claim a “search” if he voluntarily offered up information to an undercover government informant or agent. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).  In Lewis, an undercover federal narcotics agent misrepresented his identity to Lewis on the telephone, which tricked Lewis into inviting the agent inside his home for the purpose of executing unlawful narcotics transactions.  Here, Lewis voluntarily let the agent in his home even though he did so with misplaced confidence.  The home would have otherwise been a private sphere, but because Lewis allowed the agent inside, he no longer had a “reasonable” expectation of privacy. This was not a “search” and thus the government did not need to justify it or get judicial approval.  As we make our way through this Series, you will notice that, generally speaking, the law allows police officers to lie and deceive during the course and scope of their investigations.  Our civil liberties are thus generally insensitive to a suspect’s intellectual capacity.

Also, we generally do not have privacy rights in third party institutional records. What does that mean?

It means that our bank records or telephone records are generally not subject to Fourth Amendment protections. Thus, the government’s attempt to secure our bank records does not constitute a “search.”  See e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).  The bank’s records are the bank’s records  – they are not the customer’s private papers. Because the bank owns the records, we have no “reasonable” expectation of privacy in them despite the fact that they are connected to our name.

What about police surveillance on the real property that we own? What constitutes a “search” in this context?

The analysis depends upon where the surveillance happens and how it happens.  Generally, the analysis deals with the space in the home, the space immediately surrounding the home (curtilage), and the private property space outside of the curtilage.  Thus, I’ll break it down into these three areas.

(1) THE HOME:  An individual enjoys the highest expectation of privacy within the home. Any entry into the home is a “search.” To enter the home, the police must have a warrantless justification or judicial approval. I’ll discuss warrantless justifications and warrants themselves later on in the Series.

(2) THE CURTILAGE: An  individual enjoys a little less legal privacy within the “curtilage” (the enclosed area immediately surrounding and in close proximity to the dwelling house).  Thus, the government’s surveillance of the curtilage from a public vantage point and with the unaided eye is not a “search.”  For example, no “search” when the police flew over the suspect’s property and saw a marijuana plot inside the curtilage with the unaided eye. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).  In both cases, the police were not able to see what was inside the curtilage from the ground, but a an easy fly over in public airspace revealed everything with the unaided eye.  If the police had trespassed the curtilage on the ground to see what was inside, then we would’ve had “search.” In short, we do not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” into spaces that can be seen by any member of the public from a public vantage point. We must enclose and protect all four sides of the space to create expectations of privacy.

(3) THE “OPEN FIELD”: An individual can expect the least amount of legal privacy in the “open field” (areas of the private property that are dissociated with the intimacies of the home – e.g. the tool shed). Thus, police officers that trespass the “open field” and discover illegal stuff with the unaided eye is not a “search.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).  In Oliver, the police entered the suspect’s private farm without consent despite the fact that a “no trespassing sign” was posted. Officers sought to investigate whether Oliver was growing marijuana. Officers observed a field of pot with the unaided eye on the farm, but the pot field was more than a mile away from Oliver’s actual dwelling. The pot field was thus beyond the curtilage, in an “open field”, but still on private real property.  The Supreme Court held that the police surveillance here was not a “search.” A government trespass on “open field” private property is therefore not a “search.” As such, anything the police can plainly see on this “open field” is fair game without a justification or judicial approval.  In order for there to have been a “search” in Oliver, the pot field would have to be enclosed in an opaque way such that the officers would not be able to see inside without certain technology. We have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in enclosed opaque effects.

What constitutes a “search” with respect to our things, containers or effects?

Generally, if a police officer opens a purse, a bag or a wallet and looks inside, we have a “search.” And, digital manipulation also rises to the level of a Fourth Amendment “search.” Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000). In Bond, border patrol agents squeezed Steven Bond’s soft luggage and manipulated its contents – that was a “search.”  If the police want to grab our stuff and squeeze it they need a warrant or some warrantless justification to do so.  But, note that if we abandon our stuff in the trash, we lose our expectation of privacy in it – any rummaging within does not equal a “search.” California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).

What constitutes a “search” when the police use enhancement devices?

Generally, I’ve noticed the following theme in these cases: If what is observed cannot be seen with the naked eye alone, and can only be discovered with some enhancement device (e.g. binoculars) then it is more possible that we have “search.”  This is a general rule however  – the setting, manner of observance, and vantage point all play a role in the level of intrusiveness. On the other hand, if the device merely enhances sensory perception and facilitates surveillance that would otherwise be possible without the enhancement, then we  usually do not have a “search.”

Let’s take a look at some case examples. A monitoring device surrepticiously inserted into the home for the purpose of tracking movement inside is a Fourth Amendment “search.” United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). The key here is two fold: (1) the police could not have tracked movement inside the home without the device; and (2) we have a strong American policy to protect the space inside the home.  By contrast, a beeper device placed on a car to track the car’s whereabouts is not a “search.” United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).  In Knotts, the police could have tracked the car’s movement without the beeper – a person traveling in public has no expectation of privacy in his or her movements.

Let me reiterate the general theme with enhancement technology: If the device reveals information within the private sphere that the police could not have surmised without it (i.e. naked eye only), then we usually have a “search.” But, the dog sniff is an isolated exception to this general enhancement device theme.  A dog trained to sniff our closed, opaque containers (e.g., luggage at the airport) for contraband within is known as a “surgical strike.” The dog sniff “surgical strike” reveals information about what may be inside the container – information that may be undetectable with the naked eye or nose.  Notwithstanding this, the dog sniff is not a “search.” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). Federal agents used a drug dog to sniff Place’s luggage at the airport for narcotics – the dog alerted agents that drugs were inside Place’s bags. This was not a “search” because the dog (or enhancement mechanism) only reveals the possibility of contraband inside; the dog sniff does not disclose to the police what else may be inside the bag and is thus far less intrusive than, for example, the home tracking device in Karo. The tracking device in Karo was both on the home and broad enough to reveal private facts inside the home that have nothing to do with criminal activity.


A government “seizure” also triggers the Fourth Amendment. The police can seize people or tangible things. When the police seize us (e.g. detention or arrest) or our things, they must have a warrant or some warrantless justification.

When do we have a “seizure” of the person? 

A “seizure” of the person can be brief or long. If the seizure is brief, we have a detention. If the seizure is longer, we have an arrest.  Both a detention and an arrest therefore trigger the Fourth Amendment. A police officer must justify a warrantless detention (e.g. pedestrian stop) or a warrantees arrest (taken to the station house for booking). We will discuss what justifies warrantless seizures later in this Series.

A “seizure” of the person occurs when we have the following facts: (1) the government acts intentionally; (2) the suspect actually submits to some showing of government authority; and (3) a reasonable person would feel that he or she could not leave and/or otherwise terminate the encounter.

(1) The Government Acts Intentionally:  The seminal decision is Brower v. County of Inyo  489 U.S. 593 (1989). In Brower, officers were engaged in a high speed chase and intentionally placed roadblocks ahead to arrest the suspect’s movement. The roadblock was set up around a blind turn. Brower did not see the roadblock, lost control, crashed and died. Here, the police did not intend to cause the ultimate seizure if you will – death.  Instead, officers intended to stop Brower’s movement.  This amounted to a “seizure” because the government intentionally applied means to interfere with a person’s movement. It is irrelevant that officers did not intend to cause Brower to crash. Thus for example, if an officer inadvertently tripped someone, we would not have a “seizure.” The government must intend to seize for us to have a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

(2) The Suspect Actually Submits to Authority:  The famous case on this element is California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991). Hodari saw some police officers pull up so he tossed his stash and ran. Officers picked up the stash and ultimately caught Hodari. Hodari tried to claim that at the point he threw his stash and ran, he was “seized.” The Supreme Court disagreed and ruled that we must actually submit to authority in order to have a “seizure.” This means that when physical pressure is applied and/or the suspect surrenders, we have a “seizure.” Therefore, a “seizure” occurred in Hodari when the police actually tackled and arrested him (i.e. physical pressure). ***You may be wondering why the timing of when a “seizure” takes place matters. The timing of when a “seizure” happens is important because the Fourth Amendment applies at that point. And, when the Fourth Amendment applies, we must have a warrant or some warrantless justification for the government’s behavior to ensure the evidence secured by way of that “search” or “seizure” is admissible. If the Fourth Amendment is not in play, then officers do not need judicial approval or some legal justification for their behavior. Remember the exclusionary rule I explained in the Introduction: evidence discovered by way of an illegal “search” or “seizure” is not admissible in court.

(3) A Reasonable Person Would Feel That He or She Could Not Leave and/or Otherwise Terminate the Encounter: Some important decisions, among others, on this subject are Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002), Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003).  There is no bright line rule as to when a reasonable person would feel as if  he or she could not leave and/or otherwise terminate the encounter. But, to help guide you in your quest to know your rights, I would note the following theme:  If the police leave you no choice and/or interfere with your movement in some way, then we likely have “seizure.” If you have a choice and/or the police do not intentionally restrict your movement, then we likely do not have a “seizure.” The latter scenario is usually referred to as “consensual encounter” in the criminal courts. A “consensual encounter” therefore does not trigger the Fourth Amendment. The police are allowed to talk to us and ask us questions without a warrant or some legal justification. But, when the police tell us to sit on the curb while they check our identification, we likely have a “seizure” thus requiring a warrant or some warrantless justification. And, when the police put us in cuffs and take us to the station, we definitely have a “seizure.” An arrest is always a “seizure.” A detention is always a “seizure.” I will discuss the legal differences between an arrest and a detention later in this Series.

When do we have a “seizure” of things or chattels? 

What is a chattel? A chattel is a personal possession. A “seizure”of a chattel occurs when we have a substantial and/or meaningful governmental interference with someone’s possessory interest. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). In Jacobsen, a DEA agent removed a tube containing bags of cocaine from a larger cardboard box. That DEA behavior was a substantial interference with the cardboard box (chattel), and thus a “seizure” necessitating judicial approval or some warrantless exception to justify the cocaine coming into evidence.  In the Karo case discussed above, the tracking device was not a “seizure” because its placement constituted a technical trespass as opposed to a meaningful interference in an ownership interest. Similarly, it is not a “seizure” for officers to pick up a stereo for a brief second to obtain the serial numbers on the bottom. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).  In sum, we do not have black or white rules for when a “search” or a “seizure” occurs. Every analysis in criminal procedure is case by case. We must look at what the courts have said in the past and analogize or distinguish those matters to the case at hand. Cases in the past are referred to as “precedent.” Case precedent is law. And the notion of studying past cases to decide future cases is referred to as “stare decisis.” That of course is Latin. We have lots of Latin in our American judicial system.


Even if the police conduct a “search,” a defendant may not have the legal right to challenge it in court. Only those who are actual victims of a “search” can move to suppress evidence. This means that the area in which the evidence is seized must be an invasion of the defendant’s privacy. In other words, if we do not have a personal connection (i.e. some “reasonable expectation of privacy”) to the place searched, then we cannot complain about the evidence seized there, even if it was discovered illegally. This rule is known as “standing.” In court, we say the client has “standing” to challenge the “search,” because the evidence was found in a place where the client had an expectation of privacy. The standing principle derives from Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). In Rakas, a passenger in another person’s car was challenging the admissibility of a rifle found under the passenger seat as well as box shells in the glove box. Rakas did not have standing to challenge the search because he did not own the car nor did he own the evidence found. But, having a possessory interest in the evidence found does not, by itself, create an expectation of privacy in the area in which the evidence was seized. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). In Rawlings, the defendant challenged drugs found in his friend’s purse. Rawlings certainly owned the drugs, but he had no other connection to the purse, and thus he did not have standing to challenge anything found inside of it.  Rawlings had only known the purse owner for a few days at the time he hid his drugs in her purse; he had never sought nor received access to the purse before; and he had no right to exclude others from access to the purse. But, once we start dealing with places where people stay, then the standing argument becomes stronger. For example, an overnight social guest in another person’s home has access to challenge evidence found inside. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990).  But, a mere business guest in one’s home does not grant that business guest standing to challenge evidence seized inside. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998).


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Know Your Rights: Introduction

bill of rights2

Purpose of This Blog-Series 

I have decided to write a Series about our constitutional rights in a criminal law context.  My clients, colleagues, friends, and family members often ask me whether something a police officer did (or did not do) was “legal.”  My goal with this Series is to teach people what the police can and cannot do during the course and scope of their investigations.  In law school, this topic is fleshed out in a course called “criminal procedure.”  Criminal procedure focuses on several civil liberties or constitutional amendments,  which are all part of the sacred “Bill of Rights.”  The rights that we will focus on in this Series are sourced within the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  This Series will thus be broken down into chapters that relate to each Amendment.

Background – The Exclusionary Rule 

Before we get into the meat (the Chapters to come), it is important to take a step back and further explain the basic premise of criminal procedure: Evidence obtained in violation of our constitutional rights is not admissible in court (Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914);  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)). In other words, if the police secure evidence against someone in violation of one of the aforementioned Amendments, they cannot use it in court. For example, if the police coerced a confession, they cannot use it; and, for example, if the police illegally found a weapon in someone’s car, they cannot use that in court either. But, what if that person is a guilty murderer? Can the police violate the guilty murderer’s rights to obtain that guilty evidence? The answer, theoretically, is no – the exclusionary rule is designed to deter the police from violating our rights.

The exclusionary rule is riddled with exceptions that I will talk about much later in this Series. The courts permit the police to use evidence in many instances, notwithstanding clear constitutional violations. In these exceptional situations, the courts are supposed to find that, notwithstanding the police illegality, exclusion would have little to zero deterrence value.  In practice, however, bench officers have a huge bias toward admissibility. Veteran defense lawyers share countless war stories describing judges that bend over backwards to justify the admission of otherwise illegally obtained evidence. When the client is a gang member with devil horns tattooed on his forehead, and the case deals with dead alleged victims, the exceptions to the exclusionary rule seem to broaden.

Background – State Action

The Constitution only binds government actors. Thus, evidence that was procured purely by a private party does not implicate the Bill of Rights. The exclusionary rule has no application when the government was not involved in gathering the evidence. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), is the seminal decision on the state actor subject in a criminal procedure context. In Burdeau, people with no connection to the government searched through a private desk, found incriminating documents and turned them over to the authorities. The government did not participate in the search nor did it know it would happen. The search itself was wrongful, but because the government had nothing to do with it, the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections were not activated.

Now, with all that said, let’s begin the Series!




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The Officer Did Not Read Me My Rights: Do I Get a Dismissal?


This is about our Miranda rights. Most people naturally think that a police officer’s failure to advise is tantamount to a dismissal. After all, this has been the story on television for decades. But, in reality, an officer’s failure to advise may mean nothing to a judge. Why?

The Truth Behind Miranda

Miranda is a case from the late 1960s – the U.S. Supreme Court said that cops have to read us our rights if they want to interrogate us in custody. If a police officer: (1) fails to warn us of our Miranda rights, and (2) interrogates us while we are in custody, then (3) any incriminating statements that flow from that interrogation are inadmissible in court. That is the remedy for failure to advise.

Moral of the Story: Remain Silent and Ask to Speak to Your Lawyer

We can imagine then that if a police officer does not interrogate us or otherwise do so while we are in custody, then the failure to advise is meaningless. So too if we never offer incriminating statements. In any event, always remain silent and ask to speak to your lawyer!

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Miranda Rights: Sequential Confessions


Miranda Rights: Sequential Confessions

Here is the hypothetical:  A detective interrogates his suspect at the station-house absent Miranda warnings. He procures a voluntary confession. Two hours later, the same detective interrogates the same suspect in the same station-house interview room, but properly Mirandizes his suspect – he again elicits the same confession.

Are either of these confessions admissible in court? We will always argue no. In practice, courts will typically allow the second confession into evidence and exclude the first.

Sequential confession issues manifest themselves in a Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) context often in a criminal court. That is, a deliberate two-step, question first – warn later police practice to circumvent the efficacy of midstream Miranda warnings. Seibert struck down that practice and therefore excluded both confessions.

From our experience, most trial courts (and published decisions) faced with otherwise voluntary unwarned statements that are followed up with properly warned statements zero in on Oregon v. Elstad 470 U.S. 298 ( 1985), dismiss Seibert, and act like we are in the 1950s again. It is as if these courts forgot about the Miranda holding: Statements derived from custodial interrogation without warnings and a proper waiver are irrebuttably presumed compelled and thus inadmissible in the government’s case in chief. Even if unwarned statements are otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause, they are still trashed without proper warnings and a valid waiver.

THE LEVENTHAL FIRM wants to share an important (and recent) Circuit decision  – Reyes v. Lewis, ___F.3d ___, 2016 WL ____(9th Cir.,August 17, 2016), a rare published decision that in fact discusses and truly implements Seibert in a sequential confession case where the first unwarned confession is voluntary (again not via the 5th but via the 14th Amendment). More importantly, the Reyes interrogations were conducted on separate, albeit consecutive days! Seibert’s were separated by 40 minutes we believe; most of the published decisions (and trial courts we have litigated these issues before) that do understand (and apply) Seibert will focus on the length of time between both interrogations – the more time between the two equals less of a chance that the police circumvented Miranda.

In short, separate days for each round of interrogation does not kill our defense-oriented Seibert claims. This is the part of Reyes that we believe is most beneficial to our clients.